| Learning by matching YC Chen, G Hu Theoretical Economics 15 (1), 29-56, 2020 | 28 | 2020 |
| A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information YC Chen, G Hu American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15 (1), 288-322, 2023 | 20 | 2023 |
| Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification GA Chua, G Hu, F Liu Social Choice and Welfare 61, 455-488, 2023 | 11 | 2023 |
| The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences G Hu, J Li, R Tang Games and Economic Behavior 124, 305-318, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
| A theory of revealed indirect preference G Hu, J Li, J Quah, R Tang Available at SSRN 3776049, 2021 | 8* | 2021 |
| Information design in allocation with costly verification YC Chen, G Hu, X Yang arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.16001, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
| Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf MO Afacan, G Hu, J Li Journal of Mathematical Economics 111, 102967, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Bayesian Stable States YC Chen, G Hu Games and Economic Behavior 145, 102-116, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Screening by (In)accurate Inspection G Hu Available at SSRN 4797356, 2024 | | 2024 |
| The structure of Bayesian stable matchings G Hu Available at SSRN 4910284, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Convergence to Bayesian Stable States without Assuming Observability YC Chen, G Hu Available at SSRN 4720596, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Deferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information YC Chen, G Hu Available at SSRN 4024839, 2022 | | 2022 |
Yi-Chun ChenNational University of SingaporeVerified email at nus.edu.sg
